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Buddhism and American Cinema
Edited by John Whalen-Bridge and Gary Storhoff.
New York: SUNY Press, 2014, xv + 257 pages, ISBN13:
978-1-4384-5349-1 (cloth), $90.00; ISBN13:
978-1-4384-5350-7 (paperback), $29.95; ISBN13:
978-1-4384-5351-4 (electronic), $29.95.
Reviewed by Ronald S. Green,
Coastal Carolina University

T

he strength of this volume is in the number of articles that (1) describe the
orientalism inherent in certain representations of Buddhism and (2) critique the
alarming trend to pass off violence as “Buddhism” in American cinema. The
weakness of the volume is in the number of articles that (3) are possibly orientalist in
their representations of Buddhism and (4) have a tendency to pass off immoral action as
“Buddhism” in American cinema. The tension between these four types of articles is
nothing if not curious, but may be attributable to the differing methodologies of the
various authors. This review treats examples of these four types of articles. It also offers
suggestions for understanding this incongruity and, at times, offers alternative
interpretations to those of the authors.

I. The Book’s Critique of Orientalism
In chapter two, “Buddhism, Children, and the Childlike in American Buddhist Films,” Eve
Mullen focuses on three Hollywood representations of Buddhism: Little Buddha, Seven
Years in Tibet, and Kundun. In particular, using Edward Said and Donald Lopez, Mullen
describes how these films construct innocence and childhood as “Orientalist schemas of
Buddhism” (40). Mullen points out that the earlier American film Lost Horizon (1936)
likewise romanticizes Buddhism in its representation of Shangri-La, a fictionalized
version of Tibetan Shambhala. The article explains this in terms of Thanissaro Bhikkhu’s
writings on “Buddhist Romanticism”: the error of using a psychology of romanticism to
introduce Buddhism and see specific romanticized cultural interpretations as the
message of Buddhism, a trend related to orientalism.
Mullen writes that orientalism can be defined as “exaggerations, made purposefully or
not, of Asian traditions and culture, exaggerations that can be patronizing and damaging
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to the studied peoples” (41). She uses Lopez’s four principles of “new age Orientalism” to
analyze the films. New age orientalism creates an image of utopian homelands of
Buddhism; those living in such utopias are portrayed as “perfect citizens under perfect
leadership” (42). Americans are represented as savior heroes of voiceless Asians.
Americans are liberators who gain righteous control of the utopian country, including its
arts and culture. Finally, that authority is attempted to be justified (43).
Mullen points out that examples of new age orientalism are pervasive in both academe
and entertainment, including American films. The author then has a rather easy task of
demonstrating how the three films fit the four-point pattern. In Little Buddha, Tibet is
sometimes just a backdrop for the American’s coming of age story cast in appropriated
Buddhist terms such as loss of arrogance and acceptance of suffering. Likewise, the
orientalist discourse is a simple play of opposites, with a flaw: “they overlook the real
diversity within groups in order to favor an unrealistic, homogenized depiction of
subjects” (47). Mullen mentions, echoing one of Said’s main points, that such binary
divisions are not just made by critics and filmmakers but by colonialists justifying their
oppression. Mullen shows how in Kundun “Scorsese has succumbed to the fantasy of a
utopian Tibet and a perfect leader” (48). Scorsese does this in part with the rhetoric of
cinema, for example by showing repeated panoramic views of the landscape with
accompanying music by Philip Glass. Mullen notes “…the characters quote Buddhist
texts, often incomprehensible to American, non-Buddhist audiences” (48), furthering the
utopian allure.
Mullen closes by suggesting Hollywood’s portrayals of Asia serve to take focus off racism
and problems arising from social stratification at home, focusing instead on an imagined,
easily identifiable oppressor abroad. She proposes that we instead reexamine our
self-centered cultural assumptions to avoid the potential harm filmic orientalism does
both to viewers and depicted cultures.
It is obvious that I love this article, if nothing else from the fact that I am adopting it as
the measuring rod for the rest of the book. Nevertheless, I would like to add an
observation meant as more of a point for future discussion than a criticism. When
describing the opinion of Thanissaro Bhikkhu, the author writes, “Appropriations of
Buddhist teachings that do not include the Buddha’s radical prescription for realizing
no-self fail the American or other practitioner and can only offer a lesser path without
meaningful, nonegoistic transformation” (41). She underscores this point by returning to
it at the end of the essay (51). While this is a valid and persuasive criticism of the strong
individualist mentality so often represented in Hollywood films, there may be a slippery
slope danger in employing it. It might imply that the no-self doctrine of Indian Buddhism
is “more pure” than later developments, including continuing American developments,
thus itself qualifying as an example of orientalism.

II. The Book’s Critique of the Tendency to Pass Off Violence as Buddhism
Chapter six, “Dying to be Free. The Emergence of “American Militant Buddhism” in
Popular Culture,” is written by Richard C. Anderson and David A. Harper, both of whom
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have taught at the United States Military Academy at West Point. The authors write, “For
better or worse, American popular culture has appropriated an enlightenment ideology
that is primarily identified as ‘Buddhist’ and reworked it in a way consistent with an
American mythos that often attempts to alleviate suffering and provide liberation
through violence” (133–4). They term this development “American Militant Buddhism,”
which they abbreviate as “AMB.” The authors briefly review the Four Noble Truths and
Eightfold Path as teachings of Buddhism that reveal individual attainment to be
Buddhism’s primary goal. They observe that Buddhism also posits karmic retribution for
killing. Accordingly, they argue that the violent aspect of American cinematic
representations of Buddhism is “a paradoxical and potentially virulent misinterpretation
of the Dharma within popular culture” (134). They say that the pop culture
appropriation grows out of preexisting ideas of Manifest Destiny, millennialism, and
Puritanism (134). As a result, violence is presented as a legitimate, indeed the only, path
to liberation. They suggest that the expanding representation of this idea in films may be
a subversion of Buddhist ideas that were introduced to promote peace during the
Vietnam War era. It should be noted that Buddhism was introduced and popularized in
America long before that time, but the authors may be referring to the promotion of
specific tenets related to peace.
Anderson and Harper distinguish this trend from trends in Kung Fu movies, Kill Bill, and
Anger Management, wherein Asian philosophy is a backdrop for the story and not its
philosophical grounding. However, I think this might sometimes be a fine distinction and
that such films may also need to answer to the authors’ charges. Their primary exemplar
of AMB is The Matrix. They also speak in some depth about Star Wars: Episode III and Fight
Club. They quote the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra on the world being like a dream to support their
interpretation of The Matrix as having a Buddhist message. The authors do not mention
that Judeo-Christian notions seem much more pervasive in the film and in American
culture, that there are abundant references to Alice in Wonderland in the film, and that
many articles have been written citing this as a more likely source of the film’s religious
and dreamlike qualities.
The authors claim, “American popular culture has thus produced texts uniquely fusing
an enlightenment ideology and violence, a fusion seemingly contradictory to the
primary tenets of Buddhism itself” (146). They argue that although Buddhism has been
very adaptable to new cultures, “the primary tenets of Buddhism, the Four Noble Truths
and the Eightfold Path, have remained relatively unchanged, as has the prime tenet
forbidding harm to other beings” (149). They thus see AMB’s violence as a uniquely
distinguishing feature differentiating AMB from the marriage of militarism and
Buddhism in other countries such as Japan, as described in Zen at War by Brian Victoria. I
do not think this part of their argument can be easily defended, considering the
overwhelming number of time periods and regions of the world where Buddhist violence
has occurred. Likewise, presenting these tenets as the “unchanged” basis of Buddhism,
regardless of history, may be seen as orientalism as described by Mullen.
It must also be pointed out that even if we can distinguish a line separating movies in
which Asian philosophy is a backdrop for the story from those where it is the
philosophical grounding, cinema has produced numerous films wherein Buddhism is the
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clear philosophical grounding and violence remains the means to liberation. Hong Kong
seems particularly apt at this (for example, Running On Karma [2003] directed by Johnnie
To and Ka-Fai Wai). So wide is the connection of Buddhism and violence that it could
equally be argued that the authors’ refusal to recognize violence as legitimate could itself
be viewed as a new Buddhist view, one not uniquely American, but, as an American, one
in which I share.
My favorite part of this chapter may be the most tenuous and opinionated. In the
conclusion the authors write, “While AMB may be a natural result of Buddhism’s
assimilation into American culture, it is a disturbing development that might result in
some dangerous consequences” (154). The danger is that Buddhism may be stripped of
its “essential character of compassion” and liberation be spread at gunpoint (154). While
I agree, I do not think we can defend this point on the grounds of American
exceptionalism. Nevertheless, I hope we can expand the authors’ critique to the
potentially alarming tendency in cinema to pass off other forms of immoral action as
Buddhism, as further described in section IV of this review.

III. Possible Orientalism in the Book
Chapter one, “Buddhism and Authenticity in Oliver Stone’s Heaven and Earth,” provides us
with useful insights into the relationship of Buddhism and Vietnamese folk beliefs,
including those about ancestor veneration that are important in the movie. The authors,
Hanh Ngoc Nguyen and R. C. Lutz, also analyze Ly Ly, the main character, in her
transplantation to America. They refute the negative assessments of other critics who
claim she succumbs to consumerism, arguing that the depictions are a part of a larger
picture of her difficulties in America. They also make interesting points about the use of
Christian and Buddhist images in the film, both of which emphasize human suffering
(31). They contest critics’ charges of orientalism in the film by arguing that some of the
depictions are accurate in terms of Vietnamese agricultural society, but also that Stone
based the film on two books by Phung Thi Le Ly Haayslip and so “the focus is by degrees
subjective and unapologetically idyllic” (19). Is this giving Stone too much credit? Heaven
and Earth seems to be a perfect instance of new age orientalism’s utopian image of
Buddhist homelands. The film depicts a naively innocent agrarian Vietnam, apparently
with perfect village leadership before the war, and attempts to use the psychology of
romanticism to introduce Buddhism. It also relies on simple plays of opposites,
overlooking real diversity in Vietnam. As Mullen says about Kundun, the orientalist
ambiance is furthered when the characters “quote Buddhist texts, often
incomprehensible to American, non-Buddhist audiences” (48).
Since this film seems to have most of the elements Mullen describes as orientalist, how
far should we be willing to allow Stone, a professed Buddhist, artistic license in this
regard? Would we have more issues with a director’s unapologetic depictions of
blackened faces, for example, or is my analogy false? One reason for my suspicion of
Stone is that the first two films in his Vietnam trilogy, Platoon (1986) and Born on the
Fourth of July (1989), may be even more obviously orientalist in that they also conform to
Mullen’s description of the American coming of age story: going to Asia, learning to
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accept suffering, and returning home, a changed person.
Chapter eight, “Christian Allegory, Buddhism, and Bardo in Richard Kelly’s Donnie Darko,”
by Devin Harner, begins with a discussion of American cinematic treatments of life after
death over the last twenty-five years. The 1980s television show Highway to Heaven is
mentioned alongside City of Angels and other films. Harner observes that Hollywood
“turned angels into pop culture commodities” by repositioning theology and
incorporating Asian ideas of reincarnation for American tastes (180). He cautions that
these versions of reincarnation appear to come more from pop yoga teachers than
doctrinal sources.
According to Harner, “American filmmakers have also begun to explore the Buddhist
idea of the transitional state between death and the next incarnation, in which the
dharmic tally is settled” (181). This is the heart of his analysis. Harner explains that The
Tibetan Book of the Dead differentiates between the chos nyid bar do, which is experienced
between death and next rebirth, and rang bzhin bar do, which is experienced between
rebirth and death, that is, in our so-called waking life. The ghost-like bardo state between
death and rebirth is what Hollywood has latched onto. From this point on, the author
refers to numerous films with such elements as “bardo films.” These include Siesta (1987),
Final Approach (1991), The Sixth Sense (1999), Jacob’s Ladder (1990), Ghost (1990), and Donnie
Darko (2001). These films reflect the fact that one out of four Americans today believes in
reincarnation. However, broadly referring to this range of depictions as “bardo films” is
highly problematic on various levels including the abovementioned lumping of all Asian
ideas into the single category represented by that of one country or group of people.
Let’s also not forget that Catholicism includes the notion of purgatory. This is likely more
influential on American cinematic depictions of the in-between state, as in Ghost and
Donnie Darko, than is the notion of bardo. Equally influential in this regard is the work of
Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, Raymond Moody, and other psychologists who have documented
NDEs. NDE stories are widely known and have been incorporated in many Americans’
understandings of Christianity. Other plausible explanations for these movies include
Hindu views of reincarnation and disembodied spirits, some versions of which are
championed by the aforementioned American yoga teachers. In East Asian Buddhism
there are influential non-bardo notions of intermediary states after death, such as
Sukhavati, Amida’s Pure Land. Most of the films Harner mentions have more in common
with one of these concepts than with the idea of bardo (with the exception of Jacob’s
Latter, which really is based on the chos nyid bar do).
Despite the fact that Christianity (Galatians 6:7) and other religions also teach that you
reap what you sow, Harner argues that Donnie Darko “makes more sense in Buddhist
terms because bardo represents reprieve from Donnie’s illness, despite the
hallucinations, in that he has entered into a state of causality where his choices have
clear karmic result” (193). Perhaps this is what the author means when four pages earlier
he refers to but does not explain director Kelly’s “more nuanced Buddhist theological
heavy-lifting” (189). Even if Donnie Darko makes most sense in Buddhist terms—which I
feel it does not—to look at it as a “bardo film” creates more problems than it solves as we
can see from author’s analysis. For example, we know that the onscreen action is not
simply a dream or Donnie’s bardo experience. For one thing, the book, The Philosophy of
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Time Travel, which is featured in the movie (more prominently in the director’s cut) and
explains everything that happens, tells us that when time is restored, survivors will have
dreams about what happened during the time rift, as the movie’s characters indeed do. If
the bulk of the movie depicts Donnie’s bardo state, why do others vaguely remember it?
It is surprising that Harner did not mention the book. If he had, he could have made a
convincing argument that it serves as a religious text in the film, explaining people’s
lives, the nature of reality, and the path to salvation, much as The Tibetan Book of the Dead.
Indeed, it describes characters as “The Manipulated Dead” and “The Manipulated Living”
in a similar manner to The Tibetan Book of the Dead.
Though treating the book within the film would have made Harner’s analysis more
convincing, that analysis still would have problems. Though Donnie Darko is a fun cult
classic that remains highly rated, the lesser known Jacob’s Latter would have been better
for describing bardo and creating a “bardo films” genre, despite the Christian reference in
the title, which could preserve the “Christian allegory” element of the article. Enter the
Void (2009) directed by Gaspar Noé could be placed in the category of “bardo films,”
although it is not American made. It would be interesting to see what other films the
category might truly represent. Despite my critique, Harner’s article is quite good and I
hope he will view the critique amicably. He makes us aware of the trend in American
culture to depict in-between states and opens a conversation about the concept of bardo
in Tibetan Buddhism and the appropriation of Buddhist ideas in American pop culture.

IV. The Book’s Potentially Alarming Tendency to Pass Off Immoral Action as
Buddhism
The movie Lost in Translation, described by Jennifer L McMahon and B. Steve Csaki in
chapter five, potentially answers the question posed above: How far should we be willing
to allow a director artistic license in indulging orientalism? Perhaps more than any other
film described in the book, Lost in Translation has been the subject of both critical
denunciation and actual protests. While it might be argued, with a questionable degree
of success, that Stone’s personal view is not clear in Heaven and Earth, it is more certain
that director Sofia Coppola is making a firm statement in this film. That is, to a more
than middle-aged man from America, many Japanese customs and elements of culture
may well appear clownish. The opposite situation is also likely true. It is somewhat
unfortunate that the bulk of the film sets out to prove this point by making fun of
pachinko, Japanese television and commercials, karaoke, food, and the like. In short, as
critics have said, the film focuses on particular elements of Japan that Americans find
silly while ignoring everything they may find to be better than in America, including the
transportation system, healthcare, the education system, the relative lack of crime, and
for me, Buddhological research. While the authors argue that impermanence and other
Zen sensibilities are central elements at work in the film, if so, they are difficult to see.
What is clear is that there is a positive portrayal of a possible romantic affair between
Bill Murray’s character, Bob Harris, and that of the much younger Scarlett Johansson’s
character, Charlotte, both of whom are married. The basis of this affair appears to be
their mutual hatred of Japan, even if it is based on their biases. Even so, it is difficult to
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like Bob Harris. Maybe the only thing convincing audiences to do so is their fondness of
Bill Murray. Likewise, almost all we know about Charlotte comes to us from slow pans of
her partially revealed body and brooding attempts to sabotage her husband’s work
schedule. If this is a “Buddhist film” in any sense, its main characters do not support this.
Along these lines, even more objectionable in terms of what is presented as both good
and “Buddhist” is American Beauty, discussed in chapter nine by David L. Smith. Is it
strange that out of the nine chapters of this book, two are devoted to showing Buddhism
in films about middle-aged men considering affairs with much younger women/girls?
Someone might get the wrong idea. The central motif in American Beauty is the midlife
crisis of Lester, the main character, including his ephebophilia (in this case, an attraction
to mid-late teen girls). Director Sam Mendes seems to be intent on sharing his and writer
Alan Ball’s own attraction as witnessed by a number of slow motion scenes of a high
school cheerleader, Angela, as well as an in-bed nude scene near the end of the movie. In
explanation, Smith says, “A mix of sensational elements is thrown in to up the
commercial ante (masturbation! recreational drugs! borderline pedophilia!), but nothing
here is particularly surprising” (199), although he does give these elements exclamation
points. In my viewing, these elements are not thrown in but are the substance of the
film. It should also be mentioned that Lester, who is married, gives Angela a beer before
taking her to bed, both of which acts are certainly illegal and arguably immoral. Smith
describes how the film depicts Buddhist ideas such as mushotoku (nonattainment),
particularly as an answer to a quest for meaning in life (200). To back this up, Smith
makes some interesting comparisons between American Beauty and Six Feet Under, another
Alan Ball creation. In both, after running into limiting and defining obstacles, characters
experience a kind of liberation. But, “What is ‘attained’ in such freedom is certainly
paradoxical, because it brings nothing that one did not previously have” (212). While
Smith finds this to be related to Buddhism, it might share more in common with
absurdism.
Let’s return to Anderson and Harper’s criticism: “While AMB may be a natural result of
Buddhism’s assimilation into American culture, it is a disturbing development that might
result in some dangerous consequences” (154). If this is the case, shouldn’t we say the
same about the non-surprising elements of recreational drugs, borderline pedophilia,
and orientalism? As James Shields has suggested in Critical Buddhism, it should be possible
to critique morally objectionable elements in literature and film being passed off as
Buddhism without being ahistorical.

Conclusions
This book is a welcome and useful contribution to the growing area we may call
representations of Buddhism in film. The articles are engaging and the authors
demonstrate an understanding of American pop culture and film criticism. Those
interested in these topics will find the book quite valuable. However, students and
specialists in Asian Studies, Religious Studies, and Buddhist Studies may be surprised to
find so many of the articles working with different sets of methodological principles
than theirs. As students, we read Said and our advisors and dissertation committee
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members routinely underlined for deletion sentences that divided the world into East
and West, attributed an unchanging essence to Buddhism, or represented Asia in terms
of childlike innocence. Now we teach this to our own students. We teach that our
writings cannot be racist, sexist, or orientalist. In the unlikely event that we do positively
evaluate racist or other discriminatory paradigms, we must acknowledge it and provide a
strong argument for so doing. By extension, we must demand such explanations from
this book. Likewise, if we critique representations of violence, sexism, pedophilia, and
other morally objectionable activity, we should do so on philosophical, ethical grounds,
not by prooftexting allegedly pure sources, unsullied by history. I hope this book can
remind us why we do so.
There are also a few philological problems that Asianists will notice. For example, note 1
on pages 123–4 says, “The Japanese characters, the Pali, and the English equivalents for
these three Buddhist terms are as follows: impermanence, 無情 mujo (Japanese), anitya;
relational origination, codependent arising, dependent origination, and so on,
pratītya-samutpāda (we offer only the Pali for this term as the Japanese equivalent is not
succinct); and nothingness or emptiness, 無 mu, sometimes 無地 muji, sunyata.” There
are more things wrong with this note than can be addressed here but a few should be
mentioned. First, the Japanese, Pali, and English do not appear in the order stated.
Diacritical marks appear in some places but not others. The Indian equivalents are not
Pali but Sanskrit: pratītya-samutpāda should be paṭiccasamuppāda, sunyata (i.e., śūnyatā)
should be suññatā. Mujo (i.e., mujō) is not 無情 (ruthless) but 無常 (impermanence).
Most disturbing about this for me was the comment on pratītya-samutpāda: “we offer only
the Pali for this term as the Japanese equivalent is not succinct.” Unlike some other
Chinese-derived Japanese equivalents from Sanskrit terms, engi (縁起) is entirely precise
and even more succinct than the Pali term paṭiccasamuppāda. To my knowledge engi has
never been challenged in this way by philologists or anyone else.
It is not surprising that the authors of this chapter, specialists in English and Philosophy,
and the editor, also an English specialist, were not aware of these errors. Even those in
Asia-related fields have trouble with some of these issues. Because there are such
differences in disciplinary styles and understandings, it is hoped that more
Buddhologists will work on Buddhism in American cinema and collaborate with those
from other fields and continue the work this book begins.
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